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                                                             Abstract 
 
  This paper tackles the puzzle of Ricardo’s stubborn commitment to a labor theory of value 
that he himself saw as no more than an approximation to reality and which was heavily opposed by 
Malthus, his most respected contemporary. We show it is wrong to think that the theory had no 
analytical use. Quite to the contrary, it was the only defence Ricardo could find against Malthus’ 
destructive criticism, which introduced an unacceptable degree of indetermination in his theory of 
profits. By adopting the labor theory of value, Ricardo drastically simplified the method of proof of 
his main proposition, which otherwise seemed to present unsurmountable analytical difficulties. 
The irony is that the proposition was correct, quite independently of the labor theory of value, but 





Over the last two centuries many economists spent time interpreting Ricardo, in what often 
turned out to be a difficult and tricky endeavor. In a recent survey of the literature, Peach 
(1993, p. 143) concludes that the theoretical core of Ricardo’s thinking by the end of his 
life included the labor theory of value, the natural wage analysis, progressively diminishing 
agricultural returns (and the related theory of differential rent), and the law of markets. The 
puzzle is why his theoretical core had to include a labor theory of value. 
 
In the third edition of the Principles
1, Ricardo explicitly acknowledged that the labor theory 
of value is correct only for an economy in which the turnover of capital is exactly the same 
for all sectors.
2 Notwithstanding, and in spite of strong criticism from Malthus
3, he always 
maintained that the theory is a “tolerably accurate” approximation to reality even tough in 
                                                 
1  All references to the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation are from the Piero Sraffa edition. 
References to other volumes of the complete works of Ricardo edited by Sraffa will be given as  “Works”  
followed by  the number of the volume, in latin algarithms, and the page number. 
2  Principles, chapter 1, sections IV and V.  The literature shows divergent opinions on whether there has been 
a softening of Ricardo’s position on the labor theory of value between the first and third editions of the 
Principles as suggested by J. Hollander (1904), Cannan (1929), Stigler (1965) and others. Sraffa (1951) and 
Peach (1993) disagree. Ricardo himself seems to corroborate Sraffa’s position by stating in his unfinished 
paper on “Absolute Value and Exchange Value (written in the last few weeks of his life) that:  
  “...it cannot have escaped the attention of the reader that for the measure which I have proposed I 
have not claimed the character of perfection – I have now and at all other times acknowledged that it was not 
under every circumstance a measure against which no objections could be urged; on the contrary when I first 
proposed it I shewed that there were many cases of exception where it could not be correctly denominated an 
accurate measure of value...” (Works, IV, 176). 
3  Peach (1993) notes that: 
 “Malthus alone had recognised the faults in Ricardo’s exposition, and he exposed them with 
consummate skill. If there was ever a time when Ricardo might have abandoned his labour theory, with good 
cause, it was in the wake of Malthus’s criticisms” (p. 238).   2
no way essential to his conclusions
4.  In a famous letter to McCulloch he even stated that 
his theory of distribution was independent of his theory of value
5. 
 
How to explain this stubborn commitment of Ricardo to a labor theory of value that he 
himself saw as no more than an approximation to reality and which was heavily opposed by 
Malthus, his most respected contemporary? If the theory was really not necessary for his 
conclusions and produced complications and controversies, why did he cling almost 
obsessively to it? 
 
Myrdal (1955) has argued that the only possible explanation for Ricardo’s narrow-minded 
position on value theory was his philosophical commitment to the notion that property has 
its natural justification in the labor applied by man on an object. In what other way would it 
be possible to explain this attachment to an “unsupported hypothesis which leads to 
insuperable difficulties without being of any analytical use” (p. 70). More recently Niehans 
(1990) was similarly puzzled by Ricardo’s lifelong attachment to the theory and his related 
search for an invariable measure of value. “The reason”, he writes, “is difficult to 
understand because the problem, except for special and artificial cases, is not only insoluble 
but also abstruse and devoid of substantive economic meaning” (p. 93). 
 
There has been a long tradition of dismissing the puzzle by stating that Ricardo had only an 
“empirical” labor theory of value.
6 Peach (1993, p. 31), however, believes that “the claim 
that the labour theory appealed to Ricardo because he thought it was a good empirical 
approximation is an inversion of the truth.…The labour theory had supplied Ricardo with a 
graphic means of demonstrating that worsened conditions of agricultural production would 
‘permanently’ depress general profitability”.  
 
This paper elaborates on Peach’s insight, using simple models to make it accessible to a 
modern economist that is not a Ricardo specialist. Our goal is to show that it is indeed 
wrong to say that the labor theory of value was of no analytical use to Ricardo. Quite to the 
contrary, it was a very convenient way to protect the line of argument of the Principles 
from the criticism that had been used by Malthus against the Essay on the Influence of a 
Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock (henceforth Essay on Profits). By adopting the 
labor theory of value as a torelably accurate approximation, Ricardo drastically simplified 
the method of proof of the central theorem of the Essay on Profits, which otherwise seemed 
to present unsourmountable analytical difficulties. The labor theory of value was the only 
defence he could find against Malthus’ destructive criticism, a criticism which introducced 
                                                 
4  Ricardo wrote in his Notes on Malthus: 
  “Mr Malthus shews that in fact the exchangeable value of commodities is not exactly proportioned to 
the quantity of labour which has been employed on them, which I not only admit now, but have never denied. 
He proves then that the quantity of labour is not a perfect measure of value; but what are its deviations from a 
perfect measure ...?...if they are slight, as I contend they are, then we are still in possession of a measure 
tolerably accurate, and in my opinion more nearly approximating to truth than any that has yet been 
proposed...”(Works, II, 66). 
5  “After all, the great questions of Rent, Wages and Profits must be explained by the proportions in which the 
whole produce is divided between landlords, capitalists and labourers, and which are not essentially 
connected with the doctrine of value”(Works, VII, 194). 
6 See, for example, Stigler (1958), Barkai (1967), Wilson and Pate (1968), S. Hollander (1979).   3
an unnaceptable degree of indetermination in his theory of profits, shattering the 
foundations of his whole theoretical construction
7.  
 
But this paper is not just concerned with Ricardo’s analytical difficulties and on how he 
resorted to the labor theory of value to overcome them. We also want to find out who after 
all had the winning hand in the Ricardo-Malthus dispute. 
 
We start in the following section with a simple statement of the so-called “corn model” 
which is a handy way to introduced Ricardo’s chief theoretical proposition. Section 3 
shows how the controversy with Malthus can be understood as resulting from a quite 
realistic expansion of the model, and section 4 gives the exact solution for this expanded 
model. At this point we discover Ricardo was right after all, though he seemed unable to 
prove it. Section 5 shows how the labor theory of value comes into scene as a method of 
proof, therefore solving the puzzle.  
 
 
2. The Theory of Profit in the Corn Model. 
 
In early 1815 there was much public concern and intense parliamentary debate in England 
on whether a new law should be enacted to protect local agriculture from the foreign 
competition that would necessarily come from the reestablishment of peace in Europe.
8 
Among the many pamphlets on the issue published at the time was Ricardo’s Essay on 
Profits. His argument was based on the notion that the rate of profit for the economy as a 
whole was regulated by the rate of profit in agriculture and that this was bound to decline as 
agricultural production increased. This point had been argued in the Ricardo-Malthus 
correspondence since 1813 and was already clearly formulated by March 1814 when he 
wrote to Trower: 
  “...it is the profits of the farmer which regulate the profits of all other trades, 
and as the profits of the farmer must necessarly decrease with every 
augmentation of Capital employed on the land, provided no improvements be at 
the same time made in husbandry, all other profits must diminish and therefore 
the rate of interest must fall” (Works, IV, 3). 
  
The Essay on Profits derived from this theorem the practical implication that any additional 
restriction to the importation of cereals would only benefit the landlords, while with free 
importation all other classes, including farmers, would gain: 
                                                 
7 From his letters to McCulloch of December 1819 and May and June 1820 we see that Ricardo was deeply 
shaken by Malthus’s criticism. See Peach (1993, p. 207). 
8 This was one of the so-called Corn Laws. It seems that the 1815 law, which prohibted the importation of 
wheat as long as the domestic price remained bellow 80 shillings per quarter, was not very popular. There was 
street rioting in London in the 6, 7 and 8th of March but the law passed in the House of Commons on March, 
10th. Ricardo’s interesting reaction in a letter to Malthus on March 9th shows his deep personal involvement 
with the issue: 
  “The opposition to the bill is more formidable than I expected, but they appear so determined in the 
House of Commons that I suppose it will finally pass. I regret that the people should have proceeded to acts of 
riot and outrage. I am too much a friend to good order to wish to succeed through such means, besides that I 
am persuaded that they hurt rather then promote the object which they and I have in view” (Works, VI, 180).   4
  “after the exchange of capital from land to manufactures had been effected, 
the farmers themselves, as well as every other class of the community, except 
the landholders, would very considerably increase their profits” (Works, IV, 
33). 
 
The pamphlet had a clear political message. It showed that the true conflict of interest in the 
issue of prohibiting the importation of cereals was not between industry and agriculture but 
rather between the “productive” and “unproductive” classes, that is, between industrialists 
and farmers, on the one side, and landlords, on the other side
9. As Ricardo put in one of his 
letters: 
 “It follows then, that the interest of the landlord is always opposed to the 
interest of every other class in the community. His situation is never so 
prosperous, as when food is scarce and dear; whereas, all other persons are 
greatly benefited by procuring food cheap”. (Works, IV, 21) 
 
In what follows we use the so-called corn-model to derive Ricardo’s basic proposition in 
the  Essay on Profits. It is a matter of controversy whether this model is a faithful or 
complete representation of Ricardo’s early thinking.
10 No one denies, however, that the 
corn model is implicit in some of his calculations and in the numerical table of the Essay, 
and we believe this is sufficient for our purposes. We do agree, however, that he seemed 
quite aware of its limitations and was most of the time striving for a more realistic 
formulation. 
  
It is probably fair to say that in the Essay Ricardo used the corn-model to demonstrate his 
basic theoretical proposition on the rate of profit (through table and calculations) tough 
being aware that the model was a rather simplified description of reality. In this sense we 
may say he was using a “toy model” to deal with a recalcitrant complex reality.
11 As we 
will see bellow, Malthus’ criticism against the Essay was exactly that Ricardo’s basic 
theoretical proposition did not survive a more realistic expansion of the corn model.  
 
Ricardo’s corn-model argument (or calculation) was based on two assumptions, which 
should be seen as simplifying abstractions of reality. One was that the agricultural sector of 
the economy produced a homogeneous good – call it corn – using only labor, land and corn 
itself. Suppose the production of one unit of corn in the less fertile piece of land in use 
                                                 
9  This distinction between the owners of land and farmers is fundamental in Ricardo.  The owners get the rent 
of the land while the farmers get the profit produced by the agricultural business after paying rent, wages and 
other expenses. The distinction seems to reflect the reality of British agriculture by the end of the eighteenth 
century where large rural properties where units of ownership not of production and very few landowners of 
the upper classes were actively concerned in agriculture. See Habakkuk (1940) and Habakkuk (1952).  
10 See Bharadwaj (1983), Blaug (1985, p. 7n), Eatwell (1975), Garegnani (1982) and (1990), Hicks (1985), S. 
Hollander (1979, p. 146),  Langer (1982), Meek (1973), O’Brien (1981), Ong (1983), Peach (1993, p. 85), 
Rankin (1984), Roncaglia (1982). 
11 Freeman (1985, p. 41) describes the use of toy models by theoretical physicists:  “When the real world is 
recalcitrant, we build ourselves toy models in which the equations are simple enough for us to solve. 
Sometimes the behaviour of the toy model provides iluminating insight into the behavior of the real world.” 
Of course, since Ricardo, much of economic theory has been based on toy models, a phenomenon Joan 
Robinson (1973) once described as the “Ricardo Bicycle”.   5
requires aa units of corn (as seeds, for example) and ha units of labor. Since no rent is paid 
on the least productive land in cultivation, the unit cost of production on this land is (aa pa + 
ha w) where pa is the price of corn and w is the wage rate.
12 If the capital advanced by the 
farmer consists of his expenses on the corn-input and on wages, it follows that the price of 
corn is: 
 
(1)   pa =  (aa pa + ha w)(1+r) 
 
where r is the profit rate. For a given profit rate the price of corn is proportional to the unit 
cost of production in the marginal land. 
 
The second simplifying assumption was that wages were fully spent on corn and that the 
real wage was constant: 
   “We will…suppose that no improvements take place in agriculture, and that 
capital and population advance in the proper proportion, so that the real wages 
of labour continue uniformly the same”(Works, IV,12). 
 
Hence, the real wage (va) was equal to a constant corn wage
13: 
 
(2)   w =  va pa  
 
The beauty of Ricardo’s argument is that these two assumptions imply that the model of the 
economy is block-recursive, with equations (1) and (2) being sufficient to determine the 
rate of profit, independently of all other equations of the model (such as equations similar 
to (1) for the prices of all other goods and equations determining the output of each good). 
Indeed, from (1) and (2) we get: 
 
(3)   (1+r)  (aa  + ha va ) = 1    
 
                                                 
12 It has been shown by Samuelson (1959) that in general one cannot get rid of rent as a cost element by going 
to an extensive margin because in a multi-sectoral model, in which land is an input in the production of many 
goods, the extensive margin is itself a variable that can only be determined as part of the general equilibrium 
solution of the model. In the case of Ricardo, however, this problem is avoided by the implicit hypothesis that 
land is an input only in the production of the homogeneous agricultural good, corn. To assume that rent is an 
insignificant element of cost in manufacture is not that bad as a first approximation.  
13 This assumption of the Essay on Profits can be seen as an alternative definition of the “natural wage”, 
which was defined in the Principles in terms of an stationary population. In the present case, the natural wage 
is that which maintains the proper proportion between capital and population and is not inconsistent with 
capital growing at a constant percentage rate over time. With this definition, one does not have to assume, as 
Ricardo implicitly does in the Principles, that population is always at a Malthusian equilibrium in spite of 
continuing capital accumulation. See Samuelson (1978) for a discussion of this latter, “short-circuited”, 
variant of the model. See also Peach (1993, p. 103-123) for a discussion of the alternative “new view” 
assumption of a secularly declining commodity wage as part of Ricardo’s model. On the “new view” see   
Hicks and S. Hollander (1977), Casarosa (1978), S. Hollander (1979) and (1990).   6
which shows that the rate of profit in agriculture depends only on the technical coefficients 
of prodution in the less fertile piece of land in cultivation (aa  and  ha ) and on the constant 
corn-wage ( va ). Since under competition the rate of profit must be the same for all sectors 
of the economy, we have, as Ricardo would say, the rate of profit of the farmer regulating 
the rates of profit of all other trades.  
 
The key proposition of the Essay on Profits can be demonstrated as a direct corollary of 
this. If importation of corn is restricted, more food will have to be grown domestically, 
using land of worse quality. This will increase the input of labor per unit of output in the 
marginal land
14, reducing the rate of profit for the whole economy. In terms of equation (3), 
the expansion of home agriculture increases ha and, ceteris paribus, reduces r. 
 
 
3. Malthus’ Reaction. 
 
Malthus reaction to the Essay on Profits was strongly critical. Less than three weeks had 
gone after its publication, when he wrote Ricardo: 
  “I confess I think the kind of calculation which I mentioned to you in Town, 
shews in what manner profits on land may rise decidedly from the alteration in 
the relative value of corn, and therefore shews that general profits may be 
determined by the general supply of stock compared with the means of 
employing it, and not merely by the stock employed on the land.” (Works, VI, 
182) 
 
Unfortunately the calculation mentioned by Malthus was never put down in writing in his 
correspondence with Ricardo, and that is most likely the reason it has remained somewhat 
unnoticed by historians of economic thought. But it is reasonable to assume the same 
calculation was again reproduced in a letter from Maltus to Homer written four days latter 
(Works, VI, 187-188), so we can easily figure out its nature.  
 
The point of Malthus numerical counter-example (his “calculation”) was that an expansion 
of domestic agriculture will increase the price of corn relative to manufactured 
commodities, and therefore, because part of the working capital of farmers and of the 
wages of agricultural laborers is spent on manufactured goods, it is possible that as a 
consequence the rate of profit in agriculture will rise. 
  “...will it not follow that, as the real capital of the farmer which is advanced 
does not consist merely in raw produce, but in ploughs, waggons, threshing 
machines etc: and in the tea, sugar, clothes, etc, etc used by his labourers, if 
with a less quantity of raw produce he can purchase the same quantity of these 
commodities, a greater quantity of raw produce will remain for the farmer and 
landlord, and afford a greater surplus from the land for the maintainance and 
encouragement of the manufacturing and mercantile classes”(Works,VI,187). 
                                                 
14 For analytical convenience, we are assuming that the input of corn per unit of output (aa ) is the same for all 
grades of land.   7
 
The basic point of Malthus’ criticism was that the corn model implicit in the Essay on 
Profits ignored two important characteristics of the real world: that agriculture uses 
manufactured goods as intermediate inputs and that workers also spend part of their wages 
in industrial goods. Hence equation (1) has to be rewritten as: 
 
(4)   pa =  (aa pa + ma pm +ha w)(1+r) 
 
where ma is the input of manufactures needed to produce one unit of corn in the less fertile 
piece of land in use. 
 
Likewise, equation (2) becomes: 
 
(5)   w =  va pa + vm pm  
 
It assumes (as a simplifying hypothesis) that the average worker spends his wages on fixed 
quantities va of corn and vm of manufactures. 
 
From (4) and (5) we get: 
 
 
(6)   (1+r)  (aa  + ma q  + ha va + ha vm q) = 1    
 
with q =  pm / pa being the corn price of manufactures. This equation shows that the rate of 
profit in agriculture depends on technical coefficients of production in the less fertile piece 
of land in cultivation (aa , ma  and  ha ), on wage consumption coefficients ( va and vm) and 
also on the relative price between manufacture and  agriculture (q). 
 
Consider now the behavior of the rate of profit when there is an increase in the input of 
labor per unit of output in the marginal land ( ha ). Both Ricardo and Malthus believed this 
would increase the cost of production of corn, hence reducing the corn price of 
manufactures (q). But the impact on profits is ambiguous. It is obvious from equation (6) 
that we cannot determine a priori the required adjustment for the rate of profit ( r ) when we 
have both an increase in the labor coefficient ( ha ) and a decrease in the corn price of 
manufactures (q). It necessarily depends on the relative sizes of the movements. 
 
Malthus criticism introduced an uncomfortable degree of uncertainty in the main result of 
Ricardo’s model. An increase in the input of labor per unit of output in the marginal land 
will by itself reduce the rate of profit, but a reduction in the corn price of manufactures will 
cause the opposite effect. The net result seems indeterminate a priori. 
 
4. The Exact Solution. 
   8
The Ricardo-Malthus controversy on the rate of profit is a remarkable example of how the 
lack of analytical tools may hinder the progress of economic knowledge. If Ricardo had at 
his disposal the techniques of a modern economist, he would have easily overcome 
Malthus’ criticism. All he had to do was to write down the equations for the model of the 
economy and work out its comparative statics for the case of a reduction of labor 
productivity in the agricultural frontier.  
 
Consider the relevant model of the economy for the issue under consideration, on which 
probably there would be wide agreement among the disputants. The price of corn is given 
by equation (4) above, which can be reframed in corn units as: 
 
(7)   1  =  (aa  + ma q +ha v)(1+r) 
 
where q is the corn price of manufactures and v is the real wage in corn units. Obviously 
the corn price of corn equals one by definition. 
 
The price of manufactures follows from a similar equation: 
 
  p m =  (am pa + mm pm +hm w)(1+r) 
 
or, in terms of corn units: 
 
(8)   q =  (am  + mm q + hm v)(1+r) 
 
The model is completed by the corn units equivalent of equation (5) above: 
 
(9)   v =  va  + vm q  
 
 
Equations (7) to (9) are sufficient to determine the three endogenous variables, namely v, q 
and r. Using this model, a “modern Ricardo” could easily check the sign of the relevant 
derivative dr/dha and settle the controversy. 
 
It is tedious but easy to verify that: 
 
(10)   dr/dha  =  - (am  + hm va) v (1+r) /  (am  + hm va + q v) 
 
which has an unmistakable negative sign. 
 
Hence Ricardo was right! Even tough part of the circulating capital of agriculture and part 
of the expenditures of wage earners were directed towards manufactured goods, a reduction 
of labor productivity in the marginal land would lead to a reduction in the rate of profit. 
After this exact demonstration, Malthus would be forced to acknowledge that an expansion 
of domestic agriculture in detriment of imports would necessarily reduce the profitably of 
circulating capital all over the economy.    9
 
It should be pointed that the same conclusion can be reached by means of a simple 
reduction to absurd argument. Suppose the effect of an increase in the labor coefficient of 
agriculture ( ha )  is an increase in the rate of profit ( r ). Hence from (8) we conclude that, 
if the real wage does not fall, the corn price of manufactures must increase. Equation (9) 
reinforces this conclusion by showing that an increase in the corn price of manufactures 
must also increase the real wage. But consider now equation (7). It shows that if, an 
increase in the labor coefficient of agriculture is followed by an increase in the corn price of 
manufactures and an increase in the real wage, the rate of profit has to fall, which 
contradicts the initial assumption (QED).  
 
5. The Labor Theory of Value as a Method of Proof. 
 
Ricardo’s performance in the Malthus controversy and in his Principles shows a fine mind, 
quite capable of abstract reasoning. It also shows he had an adequate understanding of the 
relevant model of the economy. But the challenge of figuring out the comparative statics of 
a coefficient shift in a system of simultaneous equations was far beyond his capabilities.
15  
Ricardo’s analytical arsenal was obviously inferior to that used in the previous section, but 
his problem was not so much a lack of mathematical skill. What seemed really difficult for 
him was thinking in terms of a general equilibrium type of model in which there is the 
simultaneous determination of a set of endogenous variables. His technique of analysis was 
always typically recursive and we know it is very hard to analyze the comparative statics of 
a general equilibrium model by any process of recursive reasoning. 
 
There is an interesting letter from James Mill to Ricardo which highlights this notion of 
recursive reasoning: 
  “…I have been reading once more your last pamphlet (The Essay on Profits). 
And it has suggested this to be given to you, as an advice…never set down any 
material proposition without its immediate proof. You must never leave any 
such proposition to be inferred, through a number of steps, by yours readers 
themselves… It is this which has made the pamphlet, in question, be reckoned 
obscure, and not unjustly….You have stated repeatedly this proposition, That 
improvements in agriculture…raise the profits of stock…But you have no 
where stated the proof…My meaning is, that you should successively answer 
the question, What comes next? First of all is the improvement, What comes 
next? Ans. the increase of produce. What comes next? Ans. a fall in the price of 
corn. What comes next? – and so on.”(Works, VI, 339-340) 
 
Ricardo’s difficulty seems to stand out in a letter to Malthus: 
  “The whole appears to me a labyrinth of difficulties; one is no sooner got over 
than another presents itself, and so in endless succession.” (Works, VI, 214) 
 
It is clear that Ricardo was looking for a simple way out of the maze of circular arguments 
and lack of precision that seemed to spun from the expanded version of his early corn 
                                                 
15 See Morishima (1989) for a somewhat similar argument, though we cannot agree with this author’s dim 
view on historians of economic thought. See also Peach (1993, p. 285).   10
model after taking into account Malthus’ criticism. And the labor theory of value turned out 
to be just the simple trick needed. 
 
Let us see how Ricardo constructed the “proof” for his proposition in the Principles: 
  “We have seen that the price of corn is regulated by the quantity of labour 
necessary to produce it…We have seen, too, that all manufactured commodities 
rise and fall in price in proportion as more or less labour becomes necessary to 
their production. 
  …Suppose corn to rise in price because more labour is necessary to produce 
it; that cause will not raise the price of manufactured goods in the production of 
which no additional quantity of labour is required. If, then, wages continued the 
same, the profits of manufacturers would remain the same; but if, as is 
absolutely certain, wages should rise with the rise of corn, then their profits 
would necessarily fall”. (pp. 110-111) 
 
In a footnote Ricardo acknowledges the assumption of a labor theory of value with money 
(or gold) taken as the numeraire: 
 “The reader is desired to bear in mind that, for the purpose of making the 
subject more clear, I consider money to be invariable in value, and therefore 
every variation of price to be referable to an alteration in the value of the 
commodity” (p. 110) 
– that is to say, referable to an alteration in the labor value of the commodity. 
 
This use of money as an (approximate) invariable measure of value, that is, as a commodity 
with the magical property that the relative price of any other commodity with respect to it is 
equal to the ratio of labor inputs in their production, was justified in chapter 1, On Value, of 
the Principles: 
  “Neither gold, then, nor any other commodity, can never be a perfect measure 
of value for all things; but I have already remarked that the effect on the relative 
prices of things, from a variation of profits, is comparatively slight; that by far 
the most important effects are produced by the varying quantities of labour 
required for production; and therefore, if we suppose this important cause of 
variation removed from the production of gold, we shall probably possess as 
near an approximation to a standard measure of value as can be theoretically 
conceived.” (p. 45) 
 
Ricardo’s proof assumes a simpler version of our equation (8)  
 
(11)   pm =  (ma pm +hm w)(1+r) 
 
in which there is no corn input in the production of manufactures
16. But the crucial 
assumption is the labor theory of value which can be stated as: 
                                                 
16 He wrote in a letter to Malthus: “I think the price of commodities will be vey slightly 
affected either by a rise or a fall in the price of corn” (Works, VI, 213). 
   11
 
(12)   pa =  ha  and  pm =  hm  
 
if we assume that prices are expressed in monetary units (that is, in terms of the numeraire, 
gold) and that the unit of measurement for labor in chosen so that its input per unit of 
output in the production of gold equals one. 
 
If the price of corn ( pa  ) increases, “because more labour is necessary to produce it” ( a 
higher ha ), there will be no change in the price of manufactures if “wages continued the 
same”(that is, if w remained constant). The price of manufactured goods ( pm ), “in the 
production of which no additional quantity of labour is required” (hence  hm  remains 
fixed) would not change in this case. But since wages depend on the price of corn (as in 
equation (5) above), it is “absolutely certain” that wages will rise. Hence, from (11), the 
rate of profit has to fall, QED. 
 
A more sophisticated proof, taking into account the full model of equations (7) to (9), can 
also be derived from the fact that the labor theory of value implies that the corn price of 
manufactures is determined by the ratio of direct labor inputs in their production: 
 
(13)     q = hm / ha 
 
Substituting this into (8) and (9) gives 
 
(14)   hm =  [(am  + hm va) ha + (mm  + hm vm) hm](1+r) 
 
which shows that the labor value of manufactures is made up of the labor value of direct 
agriculture inputs in the production of manufactures and indirect agriculture inputs in 
wages, plus the labor value of direct manufactured inputs in the production of manufactures 
and indirect manufactured inputs in wages, plus profits. This equation shows that an 
increase in labor input in agriculture ( ha ) will necessarily produce a fall in the rate of 




The labor theory of value dominated much of economic thinking for a long time after its 
introduction by Ricardo, but it has always been a puzzle to explain why it was used in the 
first place, since Ricardo himself acknowledged it could be no more than a “tolerably 
accurate” approximation to reality. Malthus, his greatly respected adversary, remained 
always stubborn on this point, writing as late as 1817 that: 
  “I have read over your book with much satisfaction… but I still cannot agree 
with you that labour alone in the sense you understand it is either in theory of 
fact the best measure of exchangeable value...”  (Works, VII, 176). 
   12
Why vitiate a complex theoretical argument with an empirical approximation that was not 
essential for the conclusions? The answer is that the labor theory of value provided a simple 
method of proof for Ricardo main proposition on the theory of profits. The irony is that the 
proposition was correct, quite independently of the labor theory of value, but he was just 
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8. Appendix: Derivation of Equation (10) 
 
Equations (7) to (9) can be reduced to: 
 
(15)   1  =  (aa  + ma q  + ha va  + ha vm q  )(1+r) =  θ1(1+r)                  
 
(16)   q =  (am  + mm q + hm va + hm vmq )(1+r) =  θ2(1+r) 
 
where θ1 and θ2  stand for the first expression within parenthesis in each equation.    
 
Let r’= dr/dha and  q’= dq/dha . Taking derivatives in (15) with respect to ha gives:  
 
(17)   0  =  θ1r’ + v(1+r) + ( ma + ha vm)(1+r) q’                   
 
where we are using the fact that v = ( va  +  vm q). 
Taking  derivatives in (16) with respect to ha gives: 
   15




(19)   q’  =  θ2r’ /  θ3 
 
where   θ3  = [1-  ( mm + hm vm)(1+r) ]                   
 
Substituting (19) into (17) leads to: 
 
(20)   0  =  θ1 θ3 r’ + θ3 v  + ( ma+ ha vm)(1+r) θ2 q’                   
 
But from (16) we have 
 
(21)   θ3  = [1-  ( mm + hm vm)(1+r) ] =  (am  + hm va )(1+r) / q                
 
Substituting (21) into (20) and solving for r’ leads to: 
 
(22)    r’  = - (am  + hm va ) v / θ4 
 
where θ4  =  θ1(am  + hm va ) + θ2 v 
 
From (15) and (16) we have θ1= 1/(1+r) and θ2= q/(1+r). Substituting into (22) gives 
 
(23)   r’  =  - (am  + hm va) v (1+r) /  (am  + hm va + q v) 
 
which is equation (10), showing that sign(r’)<0. 
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